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BOOK REVIEWS
IV
In conclusion, it should be noted that the above criticisms do not, in
any way, vitiate Professor Machlup's public policy recommendations concern-
ing the basing point system and systematic freight absorption. These recom-
mendations should be accepted and S.1008 (in its original form) defeated
in the Senate, because: 1) the bill would, from an economic point of view,
legalize a pricing system which facilitates collusion in concentrated industries,
results in wasteful cross-hauling of commodities, and distorts the optimum
location of both primary producers and fabricators; and 2) the bill would,
from a legal point of view, deprive Section 2a of the Clayton Act (as amended
by the Robinson-Patman Act) and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act of whatever effectiveness they now possess in combatting price discrimi-
nation the effect of which is to substantially lessen competition. If any
legislation is enacted to clarify the law as presently interpreted in the
courts, it should be some bill such as S.1008 with the Carroll amendment
included as a 'safeguard against the lessening of competition. In no case
should the burden of proof placed on the Federal Trade Commission in its
prosecution of offenders be made any more onerous than it now is.
As far as the outlook for the future is concerned, let us realize that,
regardless of the outcome of the legislative battle over basing points, a mere
abolition of this pricing technique is not likely to prove a panacea for the
monopoly problem in our concentrated industries. Abolition of basing point
pricing and/or freight absorption in such industries should be but the first
step in a comprehensive attack on structural impediments to effective and
vigorous competition. If we are to succeed with a program of that sort,
however, our antitrust agencies shall have to be equipped with more potent
weapons than they now possess. The Sherman Act is a blunt axe-a relic
from a paleolithic age. To meet the industrial challenge of today, the anti-
trust agencies must be provided with a set of fine surgical instruments.
WALTER ADAMSt
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY PROM PLATO TO HEGEL. By Huntington Cairns.
Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1949. Pp. xvi, 567. - $7.50.
I have long thought that "legal philosophy" or "jurisprudence" would
frighten fewer people away if it were more attractively labeled; "thbrough-
going-talk-about-government" is a descriptive phrase I once suggested., This
remarkable book makes the phrase apt, for Cairns here reports, with pains-
taking fidelity, much of what thirteen thorough-going, renowned thinkers
t Assistant Professor of Economics, Michigan State College.
1. Frank, Book Review, 52 YALE L. J. 934 (1943).
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have thought-or said they thought-about that subject. So carefully has
Cairns wrought these reports that no one interested in hard thinking about
government in general, or in the legal views of any of these thinkers in
particular, can get along without this book.
Cairns demonstrates himself an astute scholar and a sagacious com-
mentator. I have tested the chapter on Aristotle, for instance, and found the
quotations, paraphrases, summaries and citations meticulously accurate. The
studies of Leibniz and Hume are, in my opinion, incomparable. And the entire
book is replete with incidental penetrating observations about "law," govern-
ment, justice, philosophy and science.
Palmer has complained that Cairns does not offer "an integrating philos-
ophy" or "indicate any particular confidence in any kind of jurisprudence or
philosophy.' 2 To my mind, this kind of neutrality-which Cairns frankly
avowsS--constitutes one of this book's virtues. Cairns does not nudge his
readers, does not insist that they accept his preferences. When he does so,
he will be writing a different book, one he promises soon to write, and one
which all people interested in government will look forward to reading. What
he does do, now and then, is perceptively to suggest the bearing of these
thirteen philosophies on our contemporary ideas and problems.
Although I do not agree with Palmer's complaint, I have one of my own.
Cairns states that "in the interests of space," he was "obliged for the most
part to forego discussion of biographical details and analysis of the cultural
influences which may have shaped the philosopher's attitude toward particular
problems. . . ." "I have not," he says, "treated their ideas as historical
facts, but as propositions to be judged on their own merits." 4 This space-
saving apology seems odd, for some of the chapters had previously appeared
in legal periodicals which would surely have allowed Cairns more room if
he had asked for it. If this impersonalized and un-historical exposition was
caused by lack of space, then I think Cairns should have published his work
in two volumes, perhaps one now and one later. For I think that his omissions
create misleading impressions.
To read the writings of a long-departed thinker, without a substantial
knowledge of his character and of the problems of his day that evoked his
thinking, is often to misread. Misreading, to be sure, may be unintentionally
educational. The usual line is that devils quote Scripture to devilish ends.
But angelic men sometimes promote wisdom by misunderstandingly-angelic-
ally-quoting devils. One could write an interesting treatise on the stimulat-
ing effects (sometimes good, sometimes bad) of misunderstood ideas: Misin-
2. Palmer, Book Review, 35 Am. BAR Assu. J. 397, 398 (1949).
3. Preface, p. x.
4. Ibid.
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terpretation of Adam Smith has, on the whole, been unfortunate; Thomas
Jefferson, as Daniel Boorstin has ably shown, both profited and suffered
from being misinterpreted. 5 But Cairns did not intend to provide provocative
misunderstandings.
Frequently, reliable information of the kind to which I refer cannot be
obtained even of a present-day foreign culture. Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking
of the difficulty American courts experience in reviewing decisions by the
courts of Puerto Rico, said: "When we contemplate such a system from
the outside it seems like a wall of stone, every part even with all the others,
except so far as our own local education may lead us to see subordinations to
which we are accustomed. But to one brought up within it, varying emphases,
tacit assumptions, unwritten practices, a thousand inferences gained only from
life, may give to the different parts wholly new values that logic and grammar
never could have got from the books."6 The task of recapturing the cultural
influences at work in a past period is correspondingly harder, at times im-
possible. Simkhovitch has pointed out that "because we 'understand' things in
our own way . .. , we imagine that we 'understand' concepts, ideas or words
that belong to a foreign culture or a different plane of thought. That is not
the case. Our understanding is only 'our' understanding. . .. " And Anatole
France warned that "To live is to change, and the posthumous life of our
written-down thoughts is not free from the rule; they only continue to exist
on condition that they become more and more different from what they were
when they issued from our minds. Whatsoever in the future may be admired
in us, will have become altogether alien from us."
I grant that too much has been made of cultural influences by those
enslaved by the notion of a dominant Time Spirit (Zeitgeist) .7 And I con-
5. BooRSrN, TE LOST WORLD OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (1948).
6. Diaz v. Gonzalez, 261 U. S. 102, 105-106 (1923).
7. See FRANK, FATE AND FREEDOM, Chapter 7 (1945).
"Desirous of discovering the sources of a thinker's thoughts, and sure that with rela-
tive ease they can be discovered," I have written elsewhere, "the intelligentsia have in-
vented the notion of the Spirit of The Age (Time Spirit, Zeit Geist). Is this not a lazy
man's device? In a given era, often there are dozens of 'spirits'; the bias of a particular
historian leads him to choose some particular 'spirit' for emphasis and to ignore others.
To shift the metaphor, in any so-called 'historical period,' there are currents and counter-
currents, not a single drift in one direction; the casual observer sees only the current
at the surface; a more careful observer peers deeper down, but may erroneously single out
one of the sub-surface currents as alone important. To use still another metaphor, the
symphony of history is full of discords. To put it still another way: while thought-
fashions mold thinking, fashions compete with one another; and enterprising thinkers
change the fashions. Influences are often undiscoverable. Sometimes they skip many
centuries: Sixteenth-century Copernicus reads what Aristarchus had written some 1800
years earlier, and rejects the notion, thoroughly accepted in his own time, that the sun
moves about the earth. Seventeenth-century Harrington, inspired by fourth-century
B. C. Aristotle and sixteenth-century Machiavelli, contrives a political theory which
shocks his contemporaries but which, via John Adams, comes in the eighteenth century to
America, where Daniel Webster takes it up in the nineteenth. What accounts for such
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cede that a thinker may project himself, in part at least, beyond his immediate
milieu, and hus transmit thoughts that, in that sense, are timeless.
As I have said elsewhere: "Who, in most instances, can describe with
accuracy the 'influences' which move men? What they have read often has
some effect. But men, particularly when creative, do not merely reproduce
the thoughts of others. Those thoughts may be provocative, stimulative.
The stimulus, however, may result not in imitation but in originality. It is the
pedant lacking originality himself, who assumes that there is nothing new
under the sun, that new ideas are simply the mathematical equivalent of older
ideas. Creation is more chemical than mechanical or mathematical. There
are psychological, as well as biological, 'sports' and mutations. Coleridge
reads the narratives of English sea voyages; there emerges, as Lowes has
shown, a poem, containing, it is true, precise phrases taken from those old
tales, but built into a work of art which is far more than the mere product of
those borrowed words. Veblen, as Dorfman discloses, scans the pages of
anthropologists and sociologists; no one would say that his The Theory of the
Leisure Class is any mere copy of what his predecessors had said, although
their ideas undoubtedly goaded his thinking. New wine goes into old bottles,
but the important fact is not the antiquity of the bottles. More than that,
often the bottles themselves are new and only the antique labels remain."8
Nevertheless, I believe that Cairns errs in excessively detaching thinkers
from their times and characters.9 Occasionally he does sketch in a bit of a
thinker's "background." These rare sketches are the best proof of the point
I am making. Indeed, Cairns, by blaming his failure further to trace
revivals? Who knows?" Frank, A Sketch of An Influence, in the volume INTERPRETA-
TIONS OF MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES 189, 218.
8. FRANK, IF MEN WERE ANGELS 234 (1942). I have criticized Pound for his tend-
ency to pigeon-hole thinkers according to their historical periods. See Frank, Book Re-
view, 52 YALE L. J. 934 (1943). And see FRANK, A SKETCH OF AN INFLUENCE, in the
volume INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES 189, 218-222 (1947).
9. Cairns, discussing Natural Law, of course recognizes that many legal rules and
institutions must be appraised according to time, place and circumstances. Is not the same
true of philosophies?
Trilling, "The Sense of The Past," in his book, The Liberal Imagination 181
(1950), exploits this theme. "In the existence of every work of literature of the past,
its historicity, its pastness," he writes', "is a factor of great importance. . . . Side by side
with the formal elements of the work, and modifying these elements, there is the element
of history, which . . . must be taken into account." He warns that "it is only if we are
aware of the reality of the past as past that we can feel it alive and present. If, for
example, we try to make Shakespeare literally contemporaneous, we make him monstrous.
He is contemporaneous only if we know how much a man of his own age he was; he is
relevant to us only if we see his distance from us. . . . In the pastness of these works
lies the assurance of their validity and relevance." It would be unfair to Trilling to
assume from this excerpt that he is a slave to the notion of an all-powerful Time Spirit.
"The poet, it is true," he says, "is an effect of his environment, but we must remember
that he is no less a cause. He may be used as a barometer, but let us not forget that he
is also part of the weather."
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cultural influences on the need to save space, indicates his belief that such
tracings are desirable, their difficulty notwithstanding. He and I differ,
apparently, only in that I believe that to omit them is to badly mar an other-
wise outstanding work.
To me, it seems that man's legal philosophy-so far as it is his own and
not merely borrowed verbiage-usually is somewhat in step with his general
world-outlook; and that outlook, in turn, usually more or less reflects his
personality. His legal philosophy, then, to the extent that it is original and
articulate, derives from the clash of his personality with the governmental
problems of his times and with the ideas of other legal philosophers with which
he is acquainted. To neglect either the individual or the social context of any
vital legal philosophizing is to depersonalize it-and thus to deform it. Com-
prehension of another calls for empathy. "I do not," said that generous and
understanding genius, Montaigne, "make the common mistake of judging
another according to what I myself am. I readily believe that in others are
things different from those that are in me. . . . In imagination, I enter into
their skin; I like and honor them all the more because they are different from
me." True, completely to enter into the perspective of another is impossible.
In the first place, the other is mutable, not a constant entity, and many of his
motivations may be concealed. Second, each of us, unavoidably, interprets,
to some extent, the ideas of others (except, maybe, mathematical ideas) ac-
cording to his own character, personality and temperament. 10 But, although
perfect comprehension is seldom possible, to try to approximate it is desirable.
To comprehend another's ideas, then, one must, at least in part, "re-
personalize" them. That is much easier to do if they are first "personalized.""'
I find it a fault in Cairns that, for all his faithful reporting of the words of
his thirteen worthies, he has not sufficiently "personalized" their philosophies.
His reporting is too textual, too little contextual.' 2 These days, we regard it
foolish to construe the wording of most statutes apart from their histories and
the intentions (so far as ascertainable) of their authors. And so, too, I think,
with the wording of a philosophy.
A good illustration of Cairns' fault is his treatment of Cicero. My guess
is that nowhere can you find a more competent analysis of, and guide to,
Cicero's formal legal writings on imatters legal and governmental. Yet I think
Cairns leaves a misleading impression, an impression that would have been
10. On the limitations of empathy, cf..ZILSEL, PROBLEMS OF EMFIRICISI, INTERNAT.
ENCYc. OF UNIFIED SCIENCE, VOl. II, No. 8, 53, 80-Si (1941).
11. The approach and much of the terminology here are borrowed from KALLEN,
ART AND FREEDOM I, 16-18 (1942).
12. Because James and Dewey have stressed the contextual method of interpreting
other philosophers, it is sometimes suggested that that method is peculiar to the pragmat-
ists. Not so. See, e.g., RussELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY, passim (1945).
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corrected if he had discussed Cicero's illuminating private correspondence.
Montaigne wrote pertinently that he was fond of reading Cicero's private let-
ters, "not only because they contain very full information on the history and
affairs of his time, but much more because they disclose his private opinions.
For I have a particular curiosity to know the soul and the genuine opinions of
my authors. From the samples of their writings which they exhibit on the
stage of the world we may form an opinion of their talents indeed, but not of
their morals or of themselves. .... I never read an author, especially one who
treats of virtue and duties, without carefully endeavoring to find out what kind
of a man he was."
Cairns remarks that Cicero was the "leading practicing lawyer of his day."
That he was. But-so some modern commentators like Schulz'13 maintain-not
as one learned in the legal rules (a jurisconsult). Cicero was, rather, an advo-
cate (orator), a sort of Clarence Darrow, a trial lawyer, not what we would
today call an "office lawyer." In addition, he was an active politician. When,
however, he philosophized about "law," he usually soared far above his activi-
ties as a trial lawyer or politician.
Cairns apparently regards that soaring as a virtue.14 Now I agree that
legal philosophy should not confine itself to what courts and other agencies of
government have done and are doing; it should include what they can do and
what they ought to do. 1 5 But the study of the possible and the desirable is
likely to be idle unless guided, to some extent at least, by the existent. And
it is surely singular how little, in his formal legal philosophizing, Cicero re-
ferred to what, from intimate, personal experiences, he knew went on in trials
and in practical politics.' 6 The clue to that omission is probably to be found
in Cicero's character. As a trial lawyer, his aim was success. He boasted-
but not in his philosophic treatises-of his ability, by using a lawyer's wiles, to
win suits for wicked men who, on the "facts" and the "law," should have lost.
As a politician, he was often unpleasantly opportunistic, willing, when it suited
him, to forget the Constitution which he purported to esteem highly. In the
case of Cataline's accomplices, it would seem that Cicero persuaded the Senate
to over-rule the Constitution in ordering the death of the accused without the
trials to which (so most scholars today believe) they were constitutionally
entitled. Defending Cassius' patently illegal conduct in raising an army,
Cicero said that Cassius had acted according to a decree from Jupiter. Of
these aspects of Cicero's nature, Cairns says nothing. The nearest he comes to
them is in his characterization of Cicero's theory of interpretation (of docu-
13. SCHULZ, ROMAN LEGAL SCIENCE, 43-45, 53-55, 74-75 (1946).
14. P. 131-132.
15. See FRANK, CouRTs ON TRIAL, passim (1949).
16. His early treatise, RHETORICAL INVENTION (which he seems to have modelled on
ARISTOTLE's R HEoRIc) does discuss some of the wiles of the orator.
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ments and laws) as "frankly opportunistic," with success, not justice, as "its
sole object. 17  Perhaps my judgment of Cicero is too harsh. Yet surely
Cairns errs in not briefly reporting the facts on which a judgment may be
based. And surely Cairns permits false inferences by not weighing Cicero's
deeds against Cicero's words. For Cicero's formal legal philosophizing was
on the highest moral plane; it identified the legal and the moral; it enthroned
ethics in a "position of dominance over law and jurisprudence."' 8
Cairns says: "With Cicero jurisprudence embraced an humanitarian
ideal. . . . At the center of his thinking was the belief that civil law, if it were
true law, was not merely the external expression of a dominant class, but a
realization of the rules of justice and reason. The effect of this principle is
plainly apparent in his theory of rights. . . . When the masses were oppressed
by the strong, they appealed for protection to some one man who managed by
establishing equitable conditions to hold the higher and the lower classes in
equality of rights.- This was also the reason for making constitutional law.
For what people have always sought is equality before the law."' 9  All that
sounds noble. But what, in terms of Cicero's practical politics, did "equality
of rights" mean? It meant that, when the Roman masses, sunk in misery',
struggled for better economic conditions, Cicero remained indifferent. Haskell
and others have shown that the Republic, lauded by Cicero, was destroyed in
part because of the greed and selfishness of the upper classes with whom
Cicero allied himself. With the death of the Republic, Cicero became a time-
server, seeking his own security and political advancement. Montaigne put
it well: ". . . outside his learning, there was no great excellence in his
soul; . . . of weakness and ambitious vanity he had much."20
Those facts are, I think, essential to a moderately clear understanding of
Cicero's philosophy. I concede that noble moral ideas merit attention even if
uttered by one whose own morals are not too nice. We would be in a sorry
way if we considered only those ideas which emanated from men who led
thoroughly blameless lives. Had Hitler uttered a profoundly wise and moral
idea, it would have been folly to reject it because of his evil character. Mon-
taigne sagely said that he would "not ignore . . . the praiseworthy qualities"
in his "adversaries." "Should we not," he asked, "dare to say of a thief that
he has a fine leg? And because she is a prostitute, must she also be syphili-
tic? . . . For my part, I can easily say: 'That thing he does wickedly, and this
17. P. 159-160.
18. P. 162.
19. P. 161-162.
20. To quote Montaigne again: "Those whom Fortune . . . has made to pass their
lives in some eminent station can by their public actions show what they are." This is
reminiscent of Aristotle: "For many men can practice virtue in their personal affairs,
but are unable to do so in their relations with others. For this reason, the saying of Bias
seems to be apt: 'Office will reveal the man.'"
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thing virtuously' . . ." At the same time, it is important to recognize when
noble ideas serve as smoke-screens for dubious conduct. If Hitler had uttered
a profoundly wise and moral idea, would it not have been folly to refrain from
peering behind it to discern his motives?
Especially today is it important to peer behind Cicero's formal words,2
because today those words are being quoted by some men who, like Cicero,
exploit high moral sentiments while condoning actual practices-in the courts
and other phases of government-that are thoroughly immoral and unjust.22
The sort of defect I find in Cairns' Cicero chapter, I also find in his
chapter on Plato.23  It shows a thorough study of the subject. But, surpris-
ingly, Cairns does not refer to the increasing number of writers who contend
that Plato-detesting the Athenian democracy of the Periclean age, and
markedly preferring the caste society of Sparta-propagandized for what to-
day we call a totalitarian state.24 Even if Cairns wholly disagreed with that
conception of Plato, he should, I think, have discussed it. Instead, Cairns
implies that Plato loved liberty, by noting that Milton-remembered always
for his passionate defense of freedom in his Areopagitica, published in 1644,
where he severely criticized Plato's advocacy of rigid censorship-"borrowed
many . . . ideas from the Republic and the Laws" for his pamphlet, The
Ready and Easy Way to Establish a Free Commonwealth, published in 1660.
Cairns does not point out that this pamphlet, probably written in despair when
the Restoration was inevitable, expressed a thorough distrust of the electorate.
It proposed, for example, a Senate composed of men elected for life. Gooch
calls this 1660 pamphlet "the supreme condemnation of the political thinker.
The noblest champion of liberty to which the age gave birth pleaded for a yoke
heavier than that against which he had fought so zealously. '25
21. Compare the discoveries made by Bentham, Thomas Jeff erson and James Wilson
when they peered behind Blackstone's words. See, e.g., FRANK, A SKEcTH OF AN INFLU-
ENCE, in the volume, INTERPRETATIONS OF MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES, 189, 191, 205,
216-217, 228-229, 230, 231 (1947).
22. See FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL, 34-35, 350-351 (1949).
23. I made the following criticism in brief, niot long after this chapter was published
in 56 HARv. L. REV. 359 (1946). See Frank, Book Review, 57 HARv. L. REV. 1120, 1127
n. 25 (1944).
24. See, e.g., SABINE, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY, 41, 81-86 (1937) ; CATLIN, THE
STORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHERS, 51 et seq. (1933) ; CROSSMAN, PLATO TODAY (1937) ;
DURANT, THE LIFE OF GREECE, 523 (1939) ; FITE, THE PLATONIC LEGEND (1934) ; Frank,
Book Review, 52 YALE L. J. 934, 937 n. 11 (1943) ; Frank, Book Review, 57 YALE L. J.
1120, 1127-1128 and n. 27 (1944); FRANK, IF MEN WERE ANGELS 192; FRANK, FATE
AND FREEDOM, 119, 319 n. (1945) cf. Corwin, Book Review, 54 HARv. L. REV. 533 (1941);
FIELD, PLATO AND His CONTEMPORARIES (1930).
For opposing views of Plato, see, e.g., MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, ANCIENT AND
MODERN, 34-35 (1940) ; Morrow, Plato and The Ride of Law, 50 PHILOSOPH. REV. 105,
106, 126 (1941).
25. Gooch continues: "We are tempted to quote the author of the 'Areopagitica'
against himself. 'To sequester ourselves out of the world into Utopian politics which can-
not be drawn into use will never mend our condition.' 'Can one read it,' asked John
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Cairns would also have done well to note some valuable suggestions of
Popper, one of the harshest Plato critics.28 Future students of Plato as a legal
philosopher must, it seems to me, either accept Popper's suggestions (at least
in part) or refute them. Let me outline a couple:
Popper claims that Plato, deriding the idea that all laws are man-made
("conventional"), falsely described all who sponsored that idea as if they be-
lieved that man-made laws are "arbitrary," with one set of laws no better
morally than another. Plato, says Popper, deliberately misdescribed the
views of some Greeks (such as Protagoras) that the man-made laws need not
be "arbitrary" or amoral, and that they are man-made in the sense that men-
not nature or God-are morally responsible for making and improving
those laws.
2 7
Popper notes that Plato, in his Crito and Apology, portrayed, for the most
part faithfully, the true Socrates as eagerly democratic-although (or be-
cause) he was a critic of democracy. But Popper charges that the Socrates
found in many other dialogues of Plato is Plato himself, using the expressions
of a fake Socrates to put over anti-democratic propaganda .2  Popper warns
that we must "realize that those who, deceived by the identification of high-
sounding words, exalt Plato's reputation as a teacher of morals and announce
to the world that his' ethics are the nearest approach to Christianity before
Christ, are preparing the way for totalitarianism and especially for a totali-
tarian, anti-Christian, interpretation of Christianity. '2
As with Plato and Cicero, Cairns' chapter on Fichte is splendid for what
it includes, but to be criticized, I think, for what it leaves out. Discussing
Fichte's writings on international relations, between 1796 and 1913, Cairns
says that Fichte's thought during this period was by no means consistent, and
that the period was one of great political turmoil. But Cairns does not reveal
Adams more than a century later, 'without shuddering? An assembly of senators for
life? If no better system of government was proposed, no wonder the people recalled
the Royal Family."' GOocH, POLITICAL THOUGHT IN ENGLAND FROM BACON TO HALIFAX,
110 (1914).
26. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY, Vol. I (1945).
27. Popper himself advocates that position. But he rejects the notion that "all regu-
larities of our social life" are "normative and man-imposed. On the contrary, there are
important natural laws of social life also. It is just the fact that in social life we meet
with both kinds of laws, natural and normative, which makes it so important to distin-
guish them clearly." Among the "natural laws of social life" he includes "psychological
and socio-psychological regularities of human behavior" and "sociological laws, connected
with the functioning of social institutions. . . . In institutions, normative lavs and so-
ciological, i.e., natural laws, are closely interwoven, and it is therefore impossible to under-
stand the functioning of institutions without being able to distinguish between these two."
Op. cit. supra note 26, at 56-57.
28. Contrast Cairns description, at 54, of Socrates' trial with that given by Popper,
op. cit. supra note 26, at 169-171. See Popper's explanation of Plato's attitude toward
Socrates, op. cit. supra note 26, at 171-176.
29. POPPER, op. cit. supra note 26, at 91.
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the nature of Fichte's twisting and turnings, except to say that "Fichte's juris-
tic thought is the bridge from Kant, which is to say from Rousseau, to Hegel;
its beginning is a theory of the individual and his natural rights, its close a
doctrine of state socialism and the national state, which would, he thought,
culminate in the future in a Christian world community."
Now I submit that, to evaluate Fichte's thoughts, one should know that
he began as a pro-French cosmopolitan; that he went through a sort of an-
archistic phase; that he once said that the fatherland of a "truly educated
Christian European" is Europe; that subsequently, when Prussia went to war
with France, he became a super-patriotic German. In that phase, he helped
ardently to create that vicious German nationalism-with its inculcation of
the subordination of the individual to the State-which, becoming, with
Hegel's assistance, the core of German education, culminated in the horrible
orgy of submission to- a dictatorship under Hitler.30
Unpleasant but plausible and fascinating explanations of Fichte's shifts
of position have been given. Popper, quoting Fichte's statement in 1799 that
"not only the dearest hopes of humanity but its very existence are bound up
with the victory of France," adds that "when Fichte made these remarks he
was negotiating for a university position in Mainz, a place then controlled by
the French." Popper also quotes Anderson's Nationalism to the effect that,
in 1804, Fichte wanted to leave Prussian employ and serve the Russian govern-
ment, because "he looked for more recognition from Russia, writing to the
Russian negotiator that if the Russian government would make him a member
of the St. Petersburg Academy of Science and pay him a salary of not less
than four hundred roubles, 'I would be theirs until death. . . .' Two years
later, the transformation of Fichte the cosmopolitan into Fichte the nationalist
was completed." 3'
I began this review by saying that legal philosophy is but hard thinking
about-theorizing about-government. Such theorizing will go wrong just to
the extent that it ignores inescapable governmental practices. 32 It is important,
then, that all but one of Cairns' thirteen legal philosophers, 33 when they
theorize about courts, do no theorizing about the distinctive and inescapable
practices of trial courts-their methods of "finding" the facts of particular
30. See, e.g., FRANK, FATE AND FREEDOM, 8-10, 293, 342-343 (1945); Kohn, The
Paradox of Fichte's Nationalism, 10 J. OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS, 319 (1949).
31. POPPER, op. cit. supra note 26, at II, 51. See also Popper's discussion, op. cit.
supra note 26, at II, 52, 298 note 58, of Kant's condemnation of Fichte.
32. See FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL, 192-197 (1949) which includes some comments
on Cairns' interesting ideas about "legal science"'
33. The single exception is Aristotle in his RHETORIC. See FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL,
371-372 (1949). Strictly speaking, Aristotle's RHETORIC dealt largely with lawsuits after
the evidence had been received.
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lawsuits. 34 This lack is peculiarly notable in the philosophic writings of Cicero
and Bacon, each of whom actively participated in many trials.
Cairns is silent about this gap in the writings of these philosophers. 5
Why? In part, I think, because, so far as I know, he has himself had little or
no experience as a trial lawyer. In larger part, I suspect, because he desires
to think of "law" as capable of being largely systematized in terms of generali-
zations, but senses that a close-up study of trial-court fact-finding would in-
terfere with satisfaction of that desire. At any rate, he fails to consider the
nature of such fact-finding.
That failure leads him to step on my toes. For he criticizes the so-called
"legal realists" (of whom I am one) in a singularly misunderstanding fashion:
He ascribes to these "realists" a surprising notion that "particular laws are
unique events distinct from all other particular laws." 38  Such a notion, as
Cairns correctly says, would compel the absurd conclusion that every legal
system must be wholly devoid of "general principles." But I know of no
"legal realists" who entertain the ridculous idea that "particular laws are
unique events." The position, briefly stated, of at least some of the "realists"
(myself included) is this:
According to traditional theory (which will do for present purposes), a
trial court's decision in any law-suit is a product of the application of a legal
generalization-a legal rule or principle-to the relevant facts of that particu-
lar suit.37  The trial court-a jury or a trial judge sitting without a jury-
must determine what are the relevant facts. The actual facts necessarily
happened outside the courtroom and in the past, before the suit began. In
most suits, those past facts are in dispute. That means that usually the testi-
34. Thomas Aquinas and Hegel did briefly consider the nature of judicial fact-
finding, but gave it little importance when constructing their theories. As to Aquinas,
see FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL, 366-367 (1949); as to Hegel, see infra. As to Plato's
brief mention of, and puzzlement about, the subject, see FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 22-23
(1950).
35. The present book, like Cairns' other writings, shows his familiarity with Maine's
works. Yet Cairns overlooks the several passages in which Maine discloses his aware-
ness of the problems involved in judicial fact-finding. See MAINE, EARLY HISTORY OF
INSTITUTIONS, 48-50 (1875); MAINE, VILLAGE COMMUNITIES, 311-312, 318 (4th
ed. 1881) ; FRANK, IF MEN WERE ANGELS, 116-117 (1942) ; FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL,
153-154 (1949).
36. P. 549.
37. As Cairns points out in some detail, a legal rule often obtains its formulation
(i.e., widens or contracts) in the process of ascertaining the facts. That is, there is an
interacting process in the determination of the "relevant" facts and the formulation of
the applicable legal rule. P. 238-239. See also WURZEL, METHODS OF JURIDICAL THINK-
ING, in the volume THE SCiENcE OF LEGAL METHOD, 390, 396-399 (1917) ; TOURTOULON,
PHILosoPHY IN THE DEVLLOPAIENT OF LAW 550-551 (1918); Frank, What Courts Do
In Fact, 26 ILL. L. REv. 645, 652-653, 656-662, 782-784 (1932).
But see FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL, Chapter 23 (1949) as to "relevant" facts. The
criticism there made of Cook, Levi and Rodell is applicable to Cairns. See also Frank,
Modern and Ancient Legal Pragmatism, 25 NoRE DAmE LAw. 207 (1950).
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mony of the witnesses, concerning those actual past facts, is oral and in con-
flict. The trial judge or jury must endeavor to "find" those actual past facts,
the "objective" facts. To do so, it is necessary to determine which of the
discrepant stories of the witnesses are correct. The trial judge or jury reaches
a "finding" as to the "objective" facts on the basis of the trial judge's or jury's
reaction to the words and demeanor of the several witnesses. That is, the trial
judge or jury must make a choice between those conflicting and irreconcilable
stories. No one has contrived any objective method for making that choice.
One trial judge or jury makes a choice which another trial judge or jury,
hearing the same stories, might reasonably reject. It is ordinarily impossible
to say that any special choice is objectively right or wrong. The choice made
in any particular suit is thus inherently subjective, idiosyncratic-and therefore
unique. And that unique choice constitutes the "facts" to which the legal rule
is applied. Each trial judge or jury possesses an immense discretion to "find"
the facts one way or another. That discretion-it might be termed "fact dis-
cretion"--exists even when the applicable legal rule is so precise as seemingly
to preclude all discretion; for "fact discretion" exists in addition to the kind
of discretion-which may be termed "rule discretion"- explicitly conferred
by a relatively few legal rules. 38  Because the witnesses' demeanor-which is
a kind of "real evidence" 3 9-- is observed by the trial courts and not by the
upper courts, the upper courts interfere little with the trial courts' exercise of
their "fact discretion": The facts as "found" by a trial court are usually
accepted by an upper court on appeal.4" The manner of "finding" the "facts"
in most lawsuits cannot, then, be generalized, cannot be stated in terms of
any rules. In its very nature, the process of "finding" the "facts" is, ordi-
narily, "un-ruly."
'41
38. See, e.g., FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 32, 57, 127-135, 169-170, 326-327 (1949);
Frank, Cardozo and the Upper-Court Myth, 13 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 369,
377-378 (1948) ; FRANK, IF MEN WERE ANGELS 91-92 (1942) ; Nash v. Fries, 129 Wis.
120, 108 N. W. 210, 211 (1906) ; Woey Ho v. U. S., 109 Fed. 888, 890 (9th Cir. 1901)
Broadcast Music v. Havana Madrid Restaurant Corp., 175 F.2d 77, 80 (2nd Cir. 1949);
Frank, Modern and Ancient Legal Pragmatism, 25 NOTRE DAmE LAW. 207 (1950).
Cairns shoves his brief mention of what I call "fact discretion" into a footnote; see
108 note 80.
39. Nokes, Real Evidence, 65 L. Q. REv. 57 (1949) ; Colby v. Klune, 178 F2d 872
(2nd Cir. 1950); Cf. WIG eORE, EVIDENCE, § 1396.
40. See, e.g., Broadcast Music Co. v. Havana Madrid Restaurant Corp., 175 F.2d
77 (2nd Cir. 1949) ; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 140 U. S. 76, 88 (1891) ; Quock Ting v.
U. S., 140 U. S. 417, 421 (1891) ; Hoontestroom v. S. S. Sagporack, (1927) A. C. 37, 49;
Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 470-472 (2nd Cir. 1946) ; Powell and Wife v. Streat-
ham Manor Nursing Home (1935) A. C. 243, 247, 249-251, 255, 263, 267; Watt or Thomas
v. Thomas (1947) A. C. 484. As to niceties in review of trial court fact-finding, see
Cervis v. Higgins, 180 F.2d 539 (2nd Cir. 1950).
41. See FRANK, COURTS ON TRIA passhn (1949). See particularly Chapter 12 as to
the trial court's unique "gestalt," which further complicates the problem.
As to ambiguity of the word "fact," and resulting confusions, see Frank, Modern
and Ancient Legal Pragmaticism, 25 NoTRE DAME LAW. 207, 233 (1950).
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It follows that a trial court's decision, in a case where the oral testimony
is conflicting, is usually a result of the combination of (1) a legal generaliza-
tion-a "particular law," i.e. a rule or principle-and (2) a unique subjective
factor called the "facts." The "particular law," being a generalization, is not
unique. But the particular decision is unique-since it is a product, in part, of
something that cannot be generalized, i.e., the subjective reaction (of the trial
judge or jury) called the "facts." It is because Cairns mistakenly assumes
that all the "legal realists," when they dwell on the uniqueness of many deci-
sions, are talking solely or primarily of the rule-component-the generalized
component-of those decisions, that he mistakenly writes down all "legal
realists" as excessively "nominalistic. -4 2
For many years I have vainly urged Cairns in his writings to face the
grave problems arising from the inescapable subjectivity of most trial-court
fact-finding. It bothers me that he now seeks to dispose of those problems by
throxying the word "nominalistic," as if it were a devastating bomb, at those
(like myself) who stress those problems.43 Those problems are too serious to
be so cavalierly disposed of. For no matter how well and justly made are the
42. See FRANK, CoRTS ON TRIAL, Chapter 29 (1949) for discussion of excessive
nominalism, excessive anti-nominalism, and a sensible combination of the two.
43. Cairns' discussion of "subjectivism" is largely confined to the argument of those
who assert that all legal rules are infected with "subjectivism." See, e.g., p. 33.
He considers unworthy of elaborate discussion Hegel's significant concession-which
Hegel himself does not elaborate-that judicial proof is unavoidably subjective. See p.
542-543. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, 141-143 (1821, transl. by Knox, 1942):
In court the specific character which rightness acquires is that it must
be demonstrable. When parties go to law they are put in the position of
having to make good their evidence and their claims and to make the
judge acquainted with the facts. These steps in a legal process are
themselves rights, and their course must therefore be fixed by law.
They also constitute an essential part of jurisprudence. . . . By the
judgment of the court, the law is applied to a single case, and the work
of judgment has two distinct aspects: first, ascertainment of the nature
of the case as a unique, single, occurrence (e.g., whether a contract,
&c., &c., has been made, whether a trespass has been committed, and if
so by whom) and, in criminal cases, reflection to determine the essential,
criminal, character of the deed; secondly the subsumption of the case
under the law that right must be restored ...
The first aspect of the work of judgment . . ., the knowledge of the
facts of the case as a unique, single, occurrence, and the description
of its general character, involves in itself no pronouncement on points
of law. This is knowledge attainable by any educated man. In settling
the character of an action, the subjective moment, i.e., the agent's insight
and intention, is the essential thing; and apart from this, the proof de-
pends not on objects of reason or abstractions, of the Understanding, but
only on single details and circumstances, objects of sensuous intuition
and subjective certainty, and therefore does not contain in itself any
absolute, objective, probative factor. It follows that judgment on the
facts lies in the last resort with subjective conviction and conscience
(anind sententia), while the proof, resting as it does on the statements
and affidavits of others, receives its final, though purely subjective,
verification from the oath.
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legal rules, injustice results when (as all too often happens) a court, through
a mistake in "finding" the "facts" of a case, sends an innocent man to death
or jail, or enters a ruinous money judgment against a defendant for an act he
did not do.4"". Tragedies of that sort which cannot be prevented must be re-
garded as the equivalent of injury by earthquakes or lightning. In so far, how-
ever, as the fact-finding process can be bettered but isn't, such tragedies are
avoidable. To avoid them should be a major task of all persons-legal philoso-
phers included-which have a genuine interest in justice. There can be little
meaning in legal rules expressive of justice, if justice in particular decisions
is wanting.4 4
Injustices in particular decisions, caused by mistakes in ascertaining the
facts, stem from the fallibilities of human beings-witnesses, trial judges and
juries. The reduction of those injustices, so far as is humanly possible, can
be had only if much public attention is centered on the remediable defects in
our method of conducting trials. Yet some persons fear to have the public
become aware of those defects. Those persons, in effect, adopt Plato's doctrine
that an elite should, for "the public good," employ "useful lies," "opportune
falsehoods."4  Thus, recently, a writer, who conceded the gravity of the
problems occasioned by faulty trial-court fact-finding, concluded as follows:
"It may well be that America is not now sophisticated enough to accept the
brutal fact that our government is, and must be, basically, in large measure, one
of fallible men, not certain laws. Some faith in the certainty of positive law
and the sureness of justice may be, at least for the present, the indispensable
cement of our social structure. If so, then the enlightenment must be
spread slowly. '46
I cannot bring myself to believe that Cairns shares that disbelief in the
vitality of our democracy. Consequently, I am sure that in his next book he will
forthrightly discuss the subjectivity of the "facts" as "found," in most cases,
by trial courts.
JEROME FRANK-1
43a. See, e.g., FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 12-13, 33, 35, 61, 88, 96-97 (1949) ; Frank,
Cardozo and The Upper-Court Myth, 13 Law and Contemp. Problems, 370, 381, 382, 388
(1948); Frank, Modern and Ancient Legal Pragmatism, 25 NoTRE DAmE LAW. 207,
256 (1950).
44. See FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL, 365-371 (1949).
45. See REPUBLIc, 307, 389, 401, 424, 459; LAWS 730.
46. Sommer, Book Review, 51 THE COMMONWEAL 348 (1949).
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